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ER 84-1557

No. NSDD 136

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April 2, 1984

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MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE REPRESENTATIVE TO THE UNITED NATIONS
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT
AGENCY

SUBJECT: U.S. Initiative to Ban Chemical Weapons (U)

The attached National Security Decision Directive reflects the President's decision to put forward during the current session of the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a draft treaty for a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:


Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment: NSDD 136

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90421**SECRET**National Security Decision
Directive Number 138**US INITIATIVE TO BAN CHEMICAL WEAPONS (U)**

After consultations with the National Security Council, I have decided that the United States Government shall put forward in the Geneva Conference on Disarmament (CD) before it recesses April 28 a draft treaty for a comprehensive, worldwide ban on chemical weapons (CW). Concurrently, the US Delegation shall propose to the Soviet Union complementary bilateral discussions, less formal than those conducted in 1977-80, to work out special bilateral arrangements to enhance the chances of Soviet compliance with a multilateral treaty. Before signing a multilateral CW treaty, implementation of verification procedures, and agreement between the US and the USSR on the accuracy and completeness of the required declarations of stockpiles and facilities is essential. (S)

Verification of a chemical weapons ban remains a challenging task requiring that we develop, present and negotiate the most effective monitoring and enforcement packages possible. This must be a continuing process. To achieve a chemical weapons ban that would advance the national security interests of the United States, we will have to take the lead in promoting bold, sound verification procedures. For that reason, I have decided that we should be willing to take the initiative by proposing an anywhere-anytime challenge inspection regime for all military or government owned or controlled facilities. The purpose of this measure is to enhance deterrence by creating a greater risk that violations will be detected and exposed, and in the event of a violation to provide the evidence necessary for an appropriate response. To implement such a provision will require the development of security measures which minimize risk to sensitive facilities not related to chemical weapons. Agreement on such an approach could prove to be a major step in both arms control and confidence-building. (S)

Every effort must be made to prevent and deter the development, despite a CW ban, of a covert weapons capability and to insure that the threat from any such violation is minimized by maintaining a strong overall U.S. and alliance defense posture and by developing necessary countermeasures or responses to violations of all kinds. Sustaining a strong deterrent and safeguards regime is important both before and after conclusion of an agreement. (S)

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- (5) Develop a program to insure that appropriate security measures are examined which could minimize risk to sensitive non-CW related facilities in the face of possible challenge inspections on short notice.
- (6) Examine whether or not limitations on chemical defense equipment, training, forces, etc. would enhance or detract from our security in an arms control regime banning chemical weapons.
- (7) Develop a strategy which makes clear the importance of our CW modernization program to deterrence and to our negotiations and insures continuation of that program until such time as these weapons are effectively banned.

Ronald Reagan

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